Thomas Jacobs, FRM, PRM , PhD
Assistant Professor of Finance
DePaul University

Tom's Portrait
1 East Jackson Boulevard
Suite 5514
DePaul University


University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Ph.D. in Finance, 2010

Doctoral Committee:
Professor George Pennacchi (Adviser)
Professor Timothy Johnson
Professor Charles Kahn
Professor Neil Pearson

Boston College, M.S. in Finance, 1994
University of Alaska Fairbanks, M.S. in Engineering and Science Management, 1991
University of Notre Dame, B.S. in Mathematics, 1986

Teaching Experience

DePaul University Department of Finance, 2010-Present

Risk Management (Fin 362)

Boston College, Lecturer, Carroll Graduate School of Management, 1996

MSF Seminar: Derivatives and Risk Management (MF 860)

Professor Robert Taggart

Professional Experience

Economic Capital Specialist, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 2003-2004
Managing Director and Head of Analytics, Bank of America 1999-2001
Director, BankBoston 1994-1999
Senior Systems Analyst, John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance 1990-1993
Electronic Warfare Officer, United States Air Force, 1986 - 1990

Curriculum Vitae (PDF)

My Research and Presentations

Working Papers

Changing Market Perceptions of Who is 'Too Big To Fail' During the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008

The government support of financial firms through direct assistance and programs to improve market liquidity during the worldwide financial crisis of 2007-2008 is unprecedented since the Great Depression. Whether a given firm is ex-ante 'Too Big To Fail' in the mind of government agents is not the principal issue for moral hazard, however. It is investor perception of 'Too Big To Fail' that drives the economically inefficient reduced funding cost for the firm. This work examines the U.S. government's crisis actions as well as two international bank bailouts in a series of event studies employing both debt and equity returns. Other than in the case of private mortgage insurer, Radian, in response to explicit support of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, I conclude that only the largest of the banks and the government sponsored enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, already perceived to be recipients of explicit or implicit government guarantees, experienced any 'Too Big To Fail' premiums in their debt securities. There is no evidence that these premiums extended to other large financial firms such as broker dealers, non-mortgage insurers or surety firms, in spite of the bailout of Bear Stearns. There is no evidence that letting Lehman Brothers fail was a surprise to investors. In addition, there is no evidence that AIG's large derivative exposures and their associated losses prior to and during the crisis led investors to infer it would be rescued. Federal Reserve programs to improve liquidity and extend lending to non-banks did not lead to 'Too Big To Fail' premiums for firms.

Work in Progress

Arbitrage Failures in the Markets for Debt During the Credit Crisis

The crisis repeatedly displayed extensive spikes in liquidity premiums for a variety of traded assets from corporate debt to government debt. This work seeks to relate the price changes to break downs in existing arbitrage relationships among firms seeking to raise liquidity in times of crisis.

The Risk Structure of Interest Rates Revisited

This work seeks to extend the literature for fitting Merton (1974) style structural models of credit spreads by exploiting jumps in asset value with stationary leverage ratios to overcome existing limitations to fitting credit spread term structures at both very short and long maturity. CDS spread data is employed for both industrial and financial firms.

Looking for the Size Cutoff of 'Too Big To Fail' Banking Institutions

A structural model approach in the spirit of Marcus and Shaked (1984) is used to fit large non-bank financial firm CDS spreads. Then, controlling for levels of deposit insurance, banks are examined along the dimensions of size, off-balance sheet exposure and derivative market concentration to search for 'Too Big To Fail' premiums in large bank senior unsecured CDS spreads.

Industry Presentations (PDF) and Articles

Dodd-Frank Not Likely to End Bailouts as Promised, July 16, 2012 in Heartlander

Systemic Risk Implications of Dodd-Frank

PRMIA Global Webinar, July 11, 2012

Announcement Link

Presentation Slides

Slides in Printer Friendly Form

Slides in Printer Friendly Notes Form

PRMIA Chicago Seminar, June 1, 2012

Announcement Link

Presentation Slides

Slides in Printer Friendly Form

Slides in Printer Friendly Notes Form

CDO Asset Selection and Structuring: The Issuer Perspective, Mar 15, 2001

Optimal Asset Selection for Securitization Structures, Sep 28, 2000

Credit Exposure Measurement Applied to Reserving and Credit Capital for Derivative Portfolios, Dec 4, 1998

Credit Derivatives:An Introduction to their Use and Pricing, Oct 21, 1998

Doctoral Student Department Presentations (PDF)

Changing Market Perceptions of Who is 'Too Big to Fail' During the Credit Crisis of 2007-2008, Oct 16, 2009

The Risk Structure of Interest Rates Revisited, Oct 26, 2007

Credit Default Swap Market Perception of the "Too Big To Fail" Phenomenon in Banking, Apr 20, 2007

Measuring Default Correlation, Oct 11, 2006

Investor Reaction in Option Markets, Apr 5, 2006

What can Garch(1,1) Modeling Tell Us About the Degree of Overreaction in Single Stock Option Volatility? Dec 7, 2005

Last modified on 7/16/2012, Copyrightę 2012 Thomas Jacobs

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